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The events in October 2017 in Catalonia 
exemplify the difficulty of establishing what 
‘excessive use of force’ means.1 Images of 
violent repression of defenceless people of all 
ages waiting to vote accompany the Spanish 
government’s spokeswoman reiterating in 
the media that what the police force is doing 
is “proportional” and therefore allegedly 
acceptable. Can scientific research add to 
the debate on what is “proportional” and 
when an intervention in non-custodial 
settings enters into what is banned under 
the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (‘CAT’)? This is not a minor 
issue. According to international databases, 
from an epidemiological point of view, 
torture happens mainly in prisons and police 
stations linked to marginalised populations. 
Ill-treatment and torture against political 
dissidents and protesters is less frequent, 
but widespread, affecting around 70% 
of countries across the world (Conrad, 
Haglund, & Moore, 2013)
The Special Rapporteur on Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (SRT) has recently 
made it clear that use of force can amount to 
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torture. Any extra-custodial use of force that 
does not pursue a lawful purpose (legality), 
or that is unnecessary for the achievement of 
a lawful purpose (necessity), or that inflicts 
excessive harm compared to the purpose 
pursued (proportionality), amounts to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (CIDT). Additionally, if the 
person is powerless (that is, a person who is 
under direct physical or equivalent control 
and is unable to escape or resist), and the 
action is intended to inflict pain or suffering 
for a certain purpose, he considers that it will 
amount to torture irrespective of the above 
considerations of lawful purpose, necessity and 
proportionality (SRT, 2017 p 23). This should 
be the standard of reference from now on.
Even the failure to take all precautions 
practically possible in the planning, 
preparation and conduct of law enforcement 
operations with a view to avoiding the 
unnecessary, excessive or otherwise unlawful 
use of force, contravenes the State’s positive 
obligation to prevent acts of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment 
within its jurisdiction (SRT, 2017 pp 23). 
Until recently, International courts have 
always been reluctant to take this stance. The 
1 See for instance https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2017/10/spain-excessive-use-of-force-
by-national-police-and-civil-guard-in-catalonia/
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SRT follows and consolidates the doctrine 
stated by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) in Cestaro v. Italy 20152 and 
Bartesaghi Gallo and Others v. Italy 2017.3 
In both these cases, the Court found that 
the violent punching, kicking and beating 
with rubber truncheons of anti-globalisation 
protestors in Genova in 2001 amounted to 
torture. In contrast, judgments emanating 
from the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights have, at the very most, considered 
such actions and even more serious physical 
abuse as only amounting to CIDT. In Finca 
La Exacta vs Guatemala (ICHR, 2002), 
the court considered “disproportionate” an 
intervention on peasants who were on private, 
occupied land4 that ended with three persons 
shot dead. The long-awaited outcome of the 
case of the women of Atenco, admitted in 
September 2016, where 11 women claimed 
to have been sexually assaulted by the 
Mexican police after a demonstration and 
2 The case involved a 62-year-old demonstrator, 
who was being compliant and surrendering, by 
an Italian police officer who beat him with a 
hand-held baton to the point where he suffered 
fractures and other injuries amounting to torture. 
3 The Court noted that, although none of the vic-
tims showed violence or resistance, and although 
all of them were manifestly unarmed, asleep or 
sitting with their hands raised above their heads, 
the police systematically and indiscriminately 
subjected each of them to violent beatings, inten-
tionally inflicting severe physical and psychologi-
cal suffering for the purposes of retaliation and 
humiliation through the use of excessive, indis-
criminate and manifestly disproportionate force.
4 A group of families occupied a landowner’s 
property to protest over their salary and living 
conditions. The operation to detain three persons 
ordered by the local court involved 200 special 
agents with the use of tear gas and support by 
helicopters. It ended with three peasants dead 
and 11 severely beaten. The Court considered 
that the intervention was legitimate but dispro-
portionate and amounted to CIDT.
whether it will result in a finding of torture 
or CIDT is likely to be determinative for 
future similar cases.5 Furthermore, the UN 
Committee against Torture has also expressed 
concern over the excessive use of force by law 
enforcement officials during the policing of 
demonstrations or crowd control.6 
Can medical and psychological 
research contribute anything to this legal 
debate on the excessive use of force and its 
relation to torture?
Intentionality and purpose. Police 
brutality or police torture? Babovic 
(2000) argues for the need to distinguish 
police brutality from police “torture.” He 
claims that excessive use of force is often 
caused by the need—and potentially legal 
right—to “establish control” and that police 
officers often act improperly in anger, 
frustration or in fear of a real or imagined 
aggression.7 In such a case, there would not 
5 There were clashes in 2002 in protests against the 
planned construction of a new international airport 
for Mexico City. In 2006, new clashes followed the 
expulsion of eight downtown flower vendors by the 
police from their traditional places in the local mar-
ket. The latter confrontation marked the beginning 
of a series of demonstrations and riots, which lasted 
over a week and resulted in over 100 arrests and 
numerous allegations of human rights abuses com-
mitted by the police against the local population, 
including the detention of 40 women, 11 of whom 
claimed they were sexually assaulted while in deten-
tion and in transport to the police station.
6 For example, Concluding Observations of CAT: 
Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/CAN/CO/6 (2012) 
§22. 362 Concluding Observations of CAT: Den-
mark, UN Doc. A/52/44 (1997) §182; Sweden, 
UN Doc. A/52/44 (1997) §222. Concluding Ob-
servations of CAT: Syria, UN Doc. CAT/C/SYR/
CO/1/Add.2 (2012) §20(j). 364 Concluding Ob-
servations of CAT: UK, UN Doc. A/54/44 (1999) 
§76(g). 365 Concluding Observations of CAT: 
Canada, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (2005) 
§4(i); Canada, UN Doc. A/56/44 (2001) §58(a).
7 This idea that torture and police brutality are dif-
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be a clear purpose according to the examples 
suggested by the Convention against Torture 
(UNCAT) definition and it therefore should 
not be considered as CIDT or torture, but as 
“excessive use of force.” This position, quite 
popular in local and national courts to avoid 
sentencing police involved in violent actions 
in the repression of collective movements, 
is misleading for the following reasons: (a) 
purpose is a necessary requirement for torture, 
but not for CIDT. It is enough to credit severe 
mental or psychological suffering by State 
agents which are not part of a lawful sanction 
(Neziroglu, 2007); (b) studies show that an 
important percentage of use of force actions 
are linked to officers confronted with situations 
that challenge their identity (e.g., displays of 
citizen disrespect). These actions to “defend 
identity” can often equate to the purposes of 
humiliation or punishment included in the 
Convention (Felson & Tedeschi, 1993); and, 
(c) selected jurisprudence and SRT reports 
have stressed the relevance of the criteria of 
“defencelessness” when analysing excessive 
use of force incidents. Defencelessness in itself 
might turn a CIDT situation into torture 
(Nowak & McArthur, 2006; SRT, 2017)
Torturing system. Repression of 
dissidents. Additionally, although the 
definition in UNCAT arguably focuses 
ferent things is reflected in the use of what could 
be considered euphemistic language. For instance, 
the Manual on Use of force and Detainee Injury 
Reporting of the Detroit Police Department labels 
Serious Use of Force to “Any action by an officer 
that involves: 1) The use of deadly force, including 
all critical firearm discharges; 2) A use of force in 
which the person suffers serious bodily injury or 
requires hospital admission; 3) A canine bite; and 
4) The use of chemical spray against a restrained 
person.” All of them actions that for an external ob-
server could perfectly be considered as potentially 
amounting to ill-treatment or torture (DPD, 2012).
on the interaction between one person 
(tormenting agent) and another (tortured 
person), torture has an undeniable social 
dimension. In its extreme form, torture is a 
social institution of power and dominance; 
it is part of a torturing system that designs, 
plans, hides and guarantees immunity and 
it uses victims to threaten and demobilise 
every layer of society. According to this 
sociological model, the purpose of violent 
actions in assemblies, demonstrations, 
protests and other non-custodial collective 
settings are demobilisation, fear, control 
and submission of the individual and the 
collective. There surely can be a purpose 
in police brutality that is covered by the 
examples given by the Convention.
Interestingly enough, political science 
has studied since the 1970’s the relationship 
between state repression and social 
mobilisation.8 The available data show that 
there is not a linear relationship between 
repression and demobilisation. In a review 
of studies, Davenport (2007) finds what he 
calls the “Punishment Puzzle”: sometimes 
the impact of repression on dissent is 
negative, sometimes it is positive, sometimes 
it is represented by an inverted U-shape, 
sometimes it is dynamic and alternates 
between negative or positive and sometimes 
it is nonexistent. We still do not have a clear 
map of key variables that help to explain the 
consequences of political repression on social 
and political movements. 
8 State repression is defined in political science as 
the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions 
against an individual or organization, within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose 
of imposing a cost on the target as well as deter-
ring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be 
challenging to government personnel, practices or 
institutions. CIDT and torture are among the most 
severe forms of state repression (Davenport, 2007).
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Measuring use of force in citizen 
encounters. Use of force is difficult to 
demarcate and observe. It can be broadly 
defined as any situation where, in the 
execution of their duty, police use verbal or 
physical force or other techniques, including 
a weapon, instrument or implement to 
respond to an actual or perceived threat 
(Hine, Porter, Westera, & Alpert, 2016). 
There have been several attempts to 
measure it for academic research. Alpert 
and Dunham (1997) developed the Relative 
Force Factor Model (RFFM) to measure the 
proportionate use of force by control agents. 
In the model, both officer’s force and level 
of suspicion of resistance is measured in a 
continuum. The relative force factor score 
is calculated by subtracting the suspect’s 
highest level of resistance to the force used 
by police. Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith 
(2003) refined this model in the RCFS 
(Resistance Force Comparative Schema) 
model. The RCFS model tries to define 
proportionality not as a static variable (the 
maximum level of force used by actors in 
a certain encounter), but in a dynamic way 
by which a comparison is made at different 
time points.9 For example, if a police officer 
uses pepper spray on a calm person, this 
is likely to provoke an aggressive reaction 
in the person and bystanders may react, 
which may in turn lead to the police using 
maximum force, physically threatening the 
bystanders and beating and handcuffing the 
originally calm person. The RFFM model, 
based on its maximum measure, would set 
out that such a reaction is a proportionate 
9 By using this dynamic measure, the immediacy 
criteria, a fundamental criteria in some penal 
codes, would be included: If a threat to police 
has not yet materialised, a forcible response is 
too early and constitutes pre-emptive force; if the 
threat has passed, a forcible response is retaliation.
intervention, as the detainee used physical 
resistance and the police answered with 
pain compliance. The RCFS measure would 
split the interaction in a sequence of events, 
measure proportionality in each moment of 
the sequence and obtain an overall score of 
whether the intervention was proportionate. 
Using this dynamic model, Paoline and 
Terrill (2011) raise different scenarios of 
resistance of a citizen (verbal resistance, 
passive physical resistance, non-assaultive 
physical reaction (i.e. going away; hiding parts 
of their body to avoid arrest), and assaultive 
physical reaction). They analyse the response 
considered appropriate by the police in a 
coercive escalation (verbal threats, verbal 
commands and threats, pain compliance 
techniques (e.g., pressure point control), 
soft empty-hand techniques (e.g., grabbing, 
shoving), hard empty-hand techniques (e.g., 
striking with fists), chemical-irritant sprays 
(e.g., oleoresin capsicum), electronic devices 
(e.g., TASER gun), baton, and projectile 
launchers (e.g., beanbag)). In a research 
study with a sample of more than 1000 
police officers from different areas of the 
US, they found that most of the respondents 
self-declared very conservative responses 
(zero to negative values in RCFS measures), 
although between 5% to 10% of police 
officers depending on geographical area, 
reported escalating to forms of maximum 
aggressiveness in the face of comparatively 
minor events (scores of +2 to +6) without 
the authors being able to define a clear 
sociodemographic pattern of the “high risk” 
policemen.10 Academic research clearly points 
10 Klahm & Tillyer (2010) reviewed all available re-
search on use of force published in peer-reviewed 
journals between 1995 and 2008. Most of the 
variables used throughout the literature seem 
to have a mixed relationship with or appear to 
be poor predictors of use of force by police. For 
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out the need for clear regulations in all kind 
of scenarios and for political decisions on 
accountability in cases of abuse.
Research using the relative force model 
is just beginning and has relied mostly on 
samples from the US and Australia (Hine 
et al., 2016). It is promising not only as 
a measurement tool for force (Hickman, 
Atherley, Lowery, & Alpert, 2015) but also 
as a tool for policing agencies to identify 
example, analysis of available evidence regarding 
officer experience and use of force shows that in 
some studies more experienced police were less 
likely to de-escalate, in others more experienced 
police recommended using less physical violence 
while some studies suggest that more experi-
enced police were simply less investigated by 
internal affairs.
‘high at risk’ officers (Bazley, Mieczkowski, 
& Lersch, 2009).
In a summary of available studies on 
violent interactions, results point to that 
police officers tend to use more physical 
violence when (a) the offence is perceived 
as more serious, (b) when they perceive 
the suspect to have less authority than 
themselves, (c) the subject is verbally but not 
physically aggressive, (d) a greater number of 
officers are involved in the situation, and, (e) 
the policemen have extra resources available 
to control the subject. Police officers are less 
likely to resort to physical violence (a) if the 
person is exceedingly resistant, (b) looks 
fit, (c) the officer perceives environmental 
risks, (d) bystanders are present (Alpert, 
2004; Bolger, 2015; Terrill, 2005; Weisburd, 
Greenspan, & Hamilton, 2000). 
Source: Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith (2003) 
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We need more refined and ecological 
models, which take into account the fact that 
police behaviour is not only based on personal 
characteristics but also on a constellation of 
factors ranging from patterns of encounters 
and personal experiences to community, 
political and work contexts. Stewart (2013) 
has tried to build such a model by measuring 
use of force through a scale that takes 
into account what he calls circumstantial 
evidences: information that the police had 
previous to the intervention, characteristics 
of the citizen involved (age, mental health 
status etc), measures of threat that the citizen 
poses against himself or others, severity of 
the alleged offence etc. The result is the 
Constitutional Force Analysis Tool (CFA) a 
very complex integrative measure of use of 
force by state agents. Although this is a very 
comprehensive tool, the data are so specific 
that it can only be carried out through an 
administrative self-report done by the agents 
after an intervention. 
It seems logical to assume that a report 
that can have legally and administratively 
adverse consequences for the security 
agents involved probably is a poor source of 
reliable information. In CFA, no contrast 
with witnesses, other officers or the alleged 
victims is carried out. In relation to that, 
one of the black holes in academic research 
are estimates of the reliability of police 
reports of incidents. Klinger & Brunson 
(2009) offer some preliminary studies on 
a high frequency of perceptual distortions 
potentially leading to erroneous decisions 
and erroneous reporting during critical 
incidents. But as these same authors 
recognise “police officers have been known 
simply to lie” (Klinger & Brunson, 2009 p 
135) to protect themselves. The extent of 
such lying is also one of the great unknowns 
within the policing world. A reliable 
measure of inaccuracy of police  
declarations in excessive use of force 
incidents would be of great help for an 
overall picture of the problem.
Bad apples or bad orders. A balanced 
use of force may well be the norm in 
non-custodial interventions, especially in 
democratic countries (Harris, 2009). The 
idea that typically only a small number 
of officers account for a disproportionate 
percentage of the total number of complaints 
of use of excessive or unnecessary force 
was already suggested by the General Force 
Research, a multicentre US study in the 
1990’s (Adams, 1996) and has consistently 
been confirmed since (William Terrill & 
Ingram, 2016).
These data do not however show whether 
there are simply always a number of “bad 
apples” in any given group, or whether there 
is a small trained group of officers (quite often 
not publicly recognised and recognisable) 
that is “allowed” to use excessive force and 
subsequently protected, or there is a lack of 
adequate control of violent units. Available 
academic data seems to give more support to 
this latter systemic hypothesis. Terril (2005) 
analysed 3,340 use of force incidents from 
three US agencies with the focus on policy 
direction and restrictiveness. The results 
show that officers working within the most 
restrictive policy framework used force less 
readily than officers who operated within 
more permissive policy environments. Data 
suggest it is a problem of environment and 
orders, not of bad apples. Chappel and Lanza 
(2009) used an anthropological observational 
methodology in a US police academy and 
found out that despite the philosophical 
emphasis on community policing and its 
themes of decentralisation and flexibility, the 
most salient lessons learned in police training 
were those that reinforced the paramilitary 
structure and culture. 
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Non-lethal weapons. The debate on 
excessive use of force as CIDT or torture is 
necessarily linked to the debate on the use of 
the so-called non-lethal weapons. Interestingly, 
in Terrill and Paoline’s study (2012) police 
officers considered the use of chemical and 
electronic weapons at very early stages in 
a process of escalation of conflict, before 
physical force. This shows the widespread idea 
that these weapons are a legitimate way of 
avoiding violence, while in fact they are a very 
violent way to solve a conflict. 
Amnesty International (AI) (2015) has 
recently produced a manual that endorses 
the use of the so-called less-lethal weapons 
to control riots and public demonstrations 
(chemical irritants, sound devices, electric 
shock devices (either projectiles or stun 
batons), kinect impact weapons (and special 
rubber balls and pellet firing shot guns) and 
water cannons). Amnesty’s position is that, if 
properly regulated, their use is an advantage 
over conventional firearms. Having different 
types of devices to confront a threat, in their 
view, would minimise the use of firearms and 
suggests they must be available as a standard 
for law enforcement agencies. The AI report 
is focused on the legal perspectives and 
does not develop in-depth social, medical 
or psychological considerations, where 
arguably the debate on CIDT/torture should. 
Even the expression less-lethal weapons 
recognises the fact that no technology can 
be guaranteed to be non-lethal. They are 
weapons that are sold as having low risk of 
permanent injury or death, as if this were the 
only relevant criteria.
The truth is that besides being 
humiliating, some of them are considered 
extremely dangerous, and that the available 
epidemiological evidence shows that their 
use entails a higher risk of injury to citizens 
than traditional use of force (Crowley, 
2016; Haar, Iacopino, Ranadive, Weiser, & 
Dandu, 2017) due to at least four reasons: 
(a) it is very difficult to respect instructions 
of use amidst the chaos of an intervention 
(i.e. minimum distance at which a human 
being can be shot safely with a rubber 
ball); (b) some of them constitute collective 
punishments as it is almost impossible to 
act selectively and bystanders, third persons 
or even demonstrators who are trying to 
help in keeping an action as a non-violent 
movement will be equally affected; (c) there 
are always especially vulnerable populations 
(i.e citizens with cardiac vulnerabilities, 
asthma or others); (d) it is very difficult to 
control abusive use (i.e. using electric shots 
in a defenceless person as a punishment). 
The use of body-worn cameras solves some 
but not of all these problems. 
Additionally, some of these implements 
(especially electric-shock devices) can be used 
as torture tools in the interrogation of detain-
ees and their availability in countries where 
no control can be guaranteed is a real risk.
The necessity and legitimacy criteria. 
Reasons for using force against 
citizens. Felson & Tedeschi (1993) defined 
from a set of interviews with police officers 
three reasons for use of force against citizens: 
(1) to establish control of a situation; (2) to 
desire to achieve or restore justice according 
to an assessment of blameworthiness; (3) for 
self-presentation or “to establish or to 
protect identities.”11 According to this 
classification, only control situations would 
11 This concern for self- presentation is even greater 
in the presence of third parties. Officers are 
socialised to “maintain the edge” and be “one 
up” on citizens not only to establish control, but 
to ensure proper respect. As a result, officers 
confronted with situations that challenge their 
identity (e.g., displays of citizen disrespect) may 
be countered by a more forceful response.
8




























allow for force to be legitimate, while 
achieving justice and establishing identity 
should be considered as an unlawful use of 
force. 
Since disrespectful behaviour should 
not form the basis for a legal response, 
while resistance does, some countries have 
legislated to consider “disrespect” as legally 
punishable. If the measure of excessive 
use of force and the measure of resistance 
are complex, the measure of “disrespect” 
is simply impossible, opening a space for 
arbitrary actions from police. Even more 
concerning and objectionable is the fact 
that in some national penal codes offences 
linked to Disrespect or Resistance to 
Authority have severe penalties including 
sometimes measures of deprivation of 
liberty, the purpose of which is too often to 
deter social activists. This can also lead to 
police charging on these grounds to avoid 
accusations of excessive force particularly 
when, in the absence of witnesses or 
video-recordings, the police version of the 
encounter always prevails. 
From the citizen’s point of view. Protests 
entail many emotions in participants. There 
are at least three objects of emotion: the 
opponent, the in-group, and contentious 
Table 2: Less-lethal weapons as related to CIDT and torture 
Humiliating or Degrading •	 Malodorant water cannon
•	 Color painting cannon 
Highly likely that third persons 
or bystanders are affected
•	 Pellet firing shot guns
•	 Sonic weapons, chemical irritants, water cannons
Likely that vulnerable citizens 
might be badly damaged
•	 Gas and chemical irritants (asthma, hyper sensibility to 
components). Deaths have been reported
•	 Electric devices (cardiac patients). Deaths have been 
reported
•	 Sonic weapons (sonic bullets, cannons etc). Damage to 
internal organs, hearing loss, eye damage. Deaths have 
been reported
Highly likely that instructions 
of use regulations cannot be 
followed in a stressful situation 
eventually provoking severe dam-
age or lethal consequences
•	 Rubber coated metal bullets (eye loss / brain concussions, 
kidney damage)
•	 Water cannons (eye loss, head concussion)
Highly likely facilitating CIDT/
Torture by the level of suffering 
inflicted
•	 Electric shock devices that do not have a cut-off point
•	 Electric gun that acts as a direct contact weapon
•	 Thumb-cuffs




•	 Body-worn electric shock belts
Source: Re-working of information included in AI (2015).
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issues. Protesters are likely to experience 
negative emotions towards their opponent 
and the contentious issue, while they most 
likely feel positive emotions towards the 
group they identify with. The analysis of 
individual and collective emotions during 
protest have shown a direct relationship 
between police actions, collective positive or 
negative emotions and escalation of conflict 
potentially leading to violence (Troost, 
Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2013).12
Using data from the UK, where there are 
strong supervision mechanisms, Smith (2009) 
found out that only 7% of citizens suffering 
police misconduct filed a complaint (and an 
additional 6% tried unsuccessfully and gave 
up), while less than 5% of these complaints 
where substantiated after investigation. In a 
review of US studies Terrill and Ingram (2016) 
showed that only between 0 and 12% of 
complaints against police use of excessive use 
of force were later sustained by investigative 
bodies when the case was considered by an 
internal process of the police.
According to the UK data, the main 
reason (62%) for those who did not complain 
was finding it a useless action. This was not 
far from reality as in those cases where the 
officer was found guilty, the research showed 
that this led to no more than a conversation 
with a supervisor or a minor administrative 
sanction. The second more frequent reason 
not to complain was that it took a lot of time 
and work. In other countries, it must be 
added that, as stated above, filing a complaint 
can have strong negative consequences for 
the person if she is counter-denounced by 
12 This is why some scholars propose that any 
measure of excessive use of force should also 
include a scale of de-escalating of conflict to 
analyse tactics used by police to prevent use of 
violence (Stewart, 2013). 
disrespect or resistance to authority.
Additional ways to discourage or 
discredit citizen allegations of excessive 
use of force is to detain the person, which 
also presents the police with an occasion to 
negotiate with the potential complainant and 
suggest not to bring charges if a legal claim is 
not already made (Smith, 2009) or to inform 
through the media only of violent intentions 
or behaviours in demonstrators creating a 
social climate of fear and a social narrative 
prone to social rejection of demonstrators 
and justification of ill-treatment (Bolshia, 
Gautier, & Flores, 2016). 
Additionally, participation in social 
movements is a stressful event in itself 
(Lau et al., 2017; Matthies-Boon, 2017) 
and suffering police violence can be an 
extremely disturbing experience. In the 
short-term, acute stress disorders, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
depression are common among victims 
(Unuvar et al., 2017) with in some cases 
a shattering of one’s assumptive world 
in the long term (Matthies-Boon, 2017) 
precluding legal actions in the initial weeks 
after the clash, when the legal claim must 
be done. Psychosocial and psycho-legal 
accompaniment might help in this case, 
although non-governmental organisations 
also face the risk of being stigmatised 
or prosecuted (INCLO, 2013). Finally, 
sometimes complainants lack support—and 
are even accused of deserving prosecution—
from relatives or friends due to it being a 
free choice to participate in a social and 
political action when knowing the risks 
potentially involved. However, more research 
is necessary.
More studies are needed generally on 
the physical and mental suffering caused by 
police violence in non-custodial settings 
and more particularly, research is clearly 
needed to document cases of potential 
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Who controls the controllers? The 
jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) uses the terms 
‘hierarchical and institutional’ and ‘practical’ 
independence (or ‘organisational’ and 
‘functional’ independence) when CIDT and 
torture claims are investigated in a national 
system. Claims that are investigated by a non-
police institution are not necessarily done 
in an independent way. Even if the process 
goes beyond administrative assessment, it 
is not an exception that police officers and 
local courts work together cooperatively on 
a day-to-day basis. We only have preliminary 
data and also need more studies on systems 
of independence indicators that allow 
for an organisational analysis of different 
schemas of complaints (Smith, 2009). Non-
independence of review procedures has 
led to some favourable judgments of the 
ECHR related to excessive use of force (e.g., 
Ramsahai v The Netherlands, 2007).
A series of studies compared whether 
there were differences in the number of 
allegations of citizens depending on the 
investigative body. Overall, if allegations 
were investigated by commanding officers, 
the odds of a positive outcome decreased 
by a 39%. Success was only slightly 
better with allegations examined by either 
an internal affairs department or by an 
external civil committee (probably due to 
difficulties in overcoming pacts of silence). 
The best results were obtained by those 
administrations where internal research was 
overseen by an external committee, which 
increased the likelihood of the allegations 
being considered by 76%. These research 
data might importantly illiminate how to 
adequately deal with citizens’ complaints to 
guarantee fair consideration of allegations of 
the use of force (Terrill & Ingram, 2016).
A good example of how accountability 
can decrease CIDT and torture at the hands 
of the police is found in Brazil. Police in 
the state of Rio de Janeiro killed more than 
8,000 people living in favelas in the decade 
between 2005 and 2015. Human Rights 
Watch conducted in-depth interviews with 
more than 30 police officers, who attributed 
the excessive use of lethal force to a pervasive 
“culture of combat” and corruption within 
military police battalions (Human Rights 
Watch, 2016). In São Gonçalo, the state’s 
second largest city, between 2008 and 2010, 
a judge, a prosecutor, and civil police officers 
made a concerted effort to address extra-
judicial killings and filed charges against 
107 military police officers—about 15 
percent of the troops in the military police 
battalion in São Gonçalo—during that 
period. The number of police killings in the 
city subsequently dropped by 70%. Some 
police officers had warned that this effort to 
promote accountability would impede police 
work and result in a rise in crime, but the 
number of robberies and overall homicides 
in São Gonçalo also declined. Progress came 
to a halt when the judge was murdered by 
some of the police officers who were facing 
prosecution. In the absence of accountability, 
the number of police killings climbed again 
and is now higher than in 2008 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016).
Media tolerance towards CIDT and 
torture. Finally, qualitative content analysis 
research has also shown that uncritical 
newspaper coverage of police-perpetrated 
ill-treatment may reflect and promote public 
and official tolerance for police violence 
(Gamal, 2017; Hirschfield & Simon, 2010) 
Conclusion. In summary, the academic 
world provides very interesting and largely 
unknown data relevant to the debate on 
CIDT and torture in non-custodial settings. 
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Surely more data is necessary to confirm 
and expand what has been reflected upon 
here. Especially relevant would be studies 
on criteria for assessing necessity, legitimacy 
and proportionality, elements that foster 
police misconduct and ways to prevent 
it using ecological models based on the 
interplay of the political, social, group, 
individual and interactive variables involved 
in these kind of situations. 
The recent report of the Special 
Rapporteur underlines the fact that the 
medical and psychosocial field has much to 
offer the legal world in better defining these 
not uncommon cases. It also gives food for 
thought regarding the need to increase the 
use of science in courts e.g. moving from a 
judge or internal review body deciding what 
is proportionate based on statements, to the 
potential use of more academic and evidence-
based models assisting judges’ decisions. 
Repression is not a thing of the past. Carey 
(2006) has studied the dynamic relationship 
between protest and repression using data 
from six Latin American and three African 
countries from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s. The results suggest that democracies 
were least likely to display continuous 
repressive behavior. However, if faced with 
popular dissent, democracies were just as 
likely to respond with coercion and negative 
sanctions as other regime types (restrictions on 
free speech, violations of life integrity rights, 
such as torture and political imprisonment, 
or other forms of state violence). In the end, 
repression has wide-reaching and negative 
consequences on society in terms of social 
control in that it can radicalise a minority, thus 
legitimise more violent actions and repression 
from the State and wide-spread political 
demobilisation of the majority due to fear.
This issue
This issue includes two papers that provide 
a more thorough understanding of the 
scientific basis for psychotherapeutic 
work with torture survivors, one of the 
priorities of the Journal (see editorial in 
issue 2017/1). This is especially important 
in certain contexts – like Africa - where 
very scarce information is available. We 
include the paper 'Towards a contextually 
appropriate framework to guide counseling 
of torture survivors in Sub-Saharan Africa' 
building on research carried out by Craig 
Higson-Smith and Gillian Eagle and 
'Efficacy of evidence-based psychosocial 
model for the rehabilitation of torture 
suvrivors' by Domininique Dix-Peek 
and Merle Werbeloff from the South 
African Centre for Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation. Although not from the 
same geographical region, these studies 
are complemented by Karen Fondacaro 
and Emily Mazulla's paper on a proposed 
Chronic Traumatic Stress Framework.
Reparation and Transitional Justice 
is a topic rarely addressed in the Journal. 
Vera Vital-Brasil describes the Clínicas do 
Testemunho, a pilot project carried out in 
Rio de Janeiro, which was supported by 
the Amnesty Commission of the Brazilian 
Ministry of Justice. The paper gives food 
for thought regarding the connection 
between individual and collective healing 
in transitional justice processes. Laurence 
Kirmayer and James Jaranson contribute 
an essay on 'Cultural logics of emotion: 
Implications for understanding torture 
and its sequalae' that provides a useful and 
broad insight into the cultural meaning 
of emotions as linked to the experience of 
torture survivors.
The Debate in this issue concerns the 
APT-sponsored research (and book) Does 
torture prevention work? The book is an 
analysis of data collected from 13 countries 
regarding whether the implementation of the 
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National Prevention Mechanisms (NPM) 
have been useful in the prevention of torture 
worldwide. Hans D. Petersen summarises 
the book and presents a critical paper 
questioning key aspects of the methodology 
and results. Carver and Handley, authors of 
the original book, respond, with a final right 
of reply given to the author of the paper. 
References
Adams, K. (1996). Measuring the prevalence of 
police abuse of force. In W. A. Geller & H. Toch 
(Eds.), Police violence: understanding and controlling 
police abuse of force (pp. 52–93). London: Yale 
Publications.
Alpert, G.P. and Dunham, R. G. (1997). The force 
factor: measuring police use of force relative to suspect 
resistance. Washington, DC:
Alpert, G. P. (2004). Interactive Police-Citizen 
Encounters that Result in Force. Police 
Quarterly, 7(4), 475–488. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1098611103260507
Amnesty International. (2015). Use of force guidelines 
for implementation of the UN basic principles on the 
use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. 
Amnesty International Netherland.
Babovic, B. (2000). Police brutality or police 
torture. Policing: An International Journal of Police 
Strategies & Management, 23, 374–380. https://
doi.org/10.1108/13639510010343047
Bartesaghi Gallo and Others v. Italy (2017) European 
Court of Human Rights 12131/13 and 43390/13
Bazley, T. D., Mieczkowski, T., & Lersch, K. 
M. (2009). Early intervention program 
criteria: Evaluating officer use of force. 
Justice Quarterly, 26(1), 107–124. https://doi.
org/10.1080/07418820801989742
Bolger, P. C. (2015). Just Following Orders: A Meta-
Analysis of the Correlates of American Police 
Officer Use of Force Decisions. American Journal 
of Criminal Justice, 40(3), 466–492. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12103-014-9278-y
Bolshia, E., Gautier, A., & Flores, M. (2016). The 
work of ITEI in Sucre, Pando and Santa Cruz 
after the events of 2008 in Bolivia. In Delivering on 
the Promise of the Right to Rehabilitation Cumpliendo 
la Promesa del Derecho a la Rehabilitación. 4-9 
December.Book of abstracts. Mexico: IRCT.
Carey, S. C. (2006). The Dynamic Relationship 
Between Protest and Repression. Political 
Research Quarterly, 59(1990), 1–11. https://doi.
org/10.1177/106591290605900101
Cestaro v. Italy (2015) European Court of Human 
Rights 6884/11
Chappell, A. T., & Lanza-Kaduce, L. (2009). Police 
Academy Socialization: Understanding the 
Lessons Learned in a Paramilitary-Bureaucratic 
Organization. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 39(2), 187–214. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0891241609342230
Conrad, C. R., Haglund, J., & Moore, W. H. (2013). 
Disaggregating torture allegations: Introducing 
the ill-treatment and torture (ITT) country-
year data. International Studies Perspectives, 
14(2), 199–220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-
3585.2012.00471.x
Crowley, M. (2016). Chemical Control: Regulation of 
Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons, Riot Control 
Agents and their Means of Delivery. Palgrave 
MacMillan.
Davenport, C. (2007). State Repression and Political 
Order. Annual Review of Political Science, 
10(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
polisci.10.101405.143216
DPD. (2012). Use of force and detainee injury reporting/
investigation. Directive 201.11.
Felson, R. B., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1993). A social 
interactionist approach to violence: Cross-cultural 
applications. Violence and Victims, 8, 295–310.
Gamal, B. R. (2017). Impact of TV Terrorism News on 
Egyptians ’ Perception of National Security Measures 
and Civil Liberties : A Cultivation Study A Thesis 
Submitted to the Department of Journalism and 
Mass Communication In partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Mast.
Haar, R. J., Iacopino, V., Ranadive, N., Weiser, 
S. D., & Dandu, M. (2017). Health impacts 
of chemical irritants used for crowd control: 
a systematic review of the injuries and 
deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray. 
BMC Public Health, 17(1), 831. https://doi.
org/10.1186/s12889-017-4814-6
Harris, C. J. (2009). Police Use of Improper 
Force: A Systematic Review of the Evidence. 
Victims & Offenders, 4(1), 25–41. https://doi.
org/10.1080/15564880701568470
Hickman, M. J., Atherley, L. T., Lowery, P. G., & 
Alpert, G. P. (2015). Reliability of the Force 
Factor Method in Police Use-of-Force Research. 
Police Quarterly, 18(4), 368–396. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1098611115586175
Hine, K. A., Porter, L. E., Westera, N. J., & Alpert, 
G. P. (2016). Too much or too little? Individual 
and situational predictors of police force relative 
to suspect resistance. Policing and Society, 0(0), 
1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.
1232257
Hirschfield, P. J., & Simon, D. (2010). Legitimating 
13

























police violence: Newspaper narratives of deadly 
force. Theoretical Criminology, 14(2), 155–182. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480609351545
Human Rights Watch. (2016). “Good Cops Are Afraid.”
ICHR. (2002). Informe No 57/02 [1]. Caso 11.382. 
Finca La Exacta vs Guatemala. 
INCLO. (2013). “Take back the streets.” Repression and 
criminalization of protest around the world. https://
tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/full_report_-_english.pdf
Klahm, C., & Tillyer, R. (2010). Understanding police 
use of force: a review of the evidence. Southwest 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 7(2), 214–239.
Klinger, D. A., & Brunson, R. K. (2009). Police 
officers’ perceptual distortions during lethal 
force situations: Informing the reasonableness 
standard. Criminology & Public Policy, 8(1), 
117–140. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
9133.2009.00537.x
Lau, J. T. F., Kim, Y., Wu, A. M. S., Wang, Z., Huang, 
B., & Mo, P. K. H. (2017). The Occupy Central 
(Umbrella) movement and mental health distress 
in the Hong Kong general public: political 
movements and concerns as potential structural 
risk factors of population mental health. Social 
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 52(5), 525–
536. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00127-017-1340-x
Matthies-Boon, V. (2017). Shattered worlds: political 
trauma amongst young activists in post-
revolutionary Egypt. Journal of North African 
Studies, 22(4), 620–644. https://doi.org/10.1080/1
3629387.2017.1295855
Neziroglu, I. (2007). A Comparative Analysis of 
Mental and Psychological Suffering as Torture , 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
under International Human Rights Treaty Law. 
Essex Human Rights Review, 4(1), 1–16.
Nowak, M., & McArthur, E. (2006). The distinction 
between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. Torture : Quarterly Journal on 
Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and Prevention of 
Torture, 16(3), 147–51.
Paoline, E. a., & Terrill, W. (2011). Listen to me! 
Police officers’ views of appropriate use of force. 
Journal of Crime and Justice, 34(3), 178–189. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648X.2011.609740
Ramsahai v The Netherlands. (2007) European 
Court of Human Rights no. 52391/99
Smith, G. (2009). Why Don’t More People 
Complain against the Police? European Journal 
of Criminology, 6(3), 249–266. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1477370809102167
Special Rapporteur Against Torture. (2017). Extra-
custodial use of force and the prohibition of torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Vol. A/72/178).
Stewart, G. (2013). A Quantitative Method for the 
Analysis of Constitutional Factors in Police Use of 
Force. Porland State University.
Terrill, W. (2005). Police use of force: A transactional 
approach. Justice Quarterly, 22(1), 107–138. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0741882042000333663
Terrill, W., Alpert, G., Dunham, R. G., & Smith, M. 
R. (2003). A Management Tool for Evaluating 
Police Use of Force: An Application of the 
Force Factor. Police Quarterly 2003, 6, 150. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611103006002002 
10.1177/1098611102250491
Terrill, W., & Ingram, J. R. (2016). Citizen 
Complaints Against the Police. Police 
Quarterly, 19(2), 150–179. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1098611115613320
Terrill, W., & Paoline, E. A. (2012). Conducted 
Energy Devices (CEDs) and Citizen Injuries: 
The Shocking Empirical Reality. Justice Quarterly, 
29(2), 153–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/0741882
5.2010.549834
Troost, D. Van, Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, 
B. (2013). Emotions in protest. In Emotions in 
Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension.
Unuvar, U., Yilmaz, D., Ozyildirim, I., Dokudan, 
E.Y., Korkmaz, C., Doğanoğlu, S., Kutlu, L., 
Fincanci, SK. (2017). Usage of Riot Control 
Agents and other methods resulting in physical 
and psychological injuries sustained during civil 
unrest in Turkey in 2013. Journal of Forensic 
and Legal Medicine, 45, 47–52. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jflm.2016.11.007
Viñar, M., & Ulriksen, M. (1990). Fracturas de la 
Memoria. Cronicas de una memoria por venir. 
Montevideo: Trilce.
Weisburd, D., Greenspan, R., & Hamilton, E. (2000). 
Police attitudes toward abuse of authority: 
Findings from a national study, 1–15.
